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BOOK REVIEWS
Human Rights Quarterly 37 (2015) 240–283 © 2015 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
Allen E. Buchanan, The Heart of 
Human Rights (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2013), ISBN 978-
0-19-932538-2, 320 pages.
This is a massive book that covers so 
much ground that nothing of review 
length could do it justice, so I’ll focus on 
what I believe is the most interesting and 
fruitful aspect of the book—its assessment 
of whether the legal order of international 
human rights is, at present, capable of 
anything more than a diagnosis of global 
problems. Put otherwise, can this system 
to which so many look for remedies 
actually offer remedies, or is something 
more needed to fix the world’s more 
entrenched forms of injustice? 
Before we dive into that question, let 
us glance at the book’s broader ambitions. 
Allen Buchanan does a good job taking 
the reader through many of the dominant 
schools of philosophical thought about 
human rights, asking whether any offer 
adequate justification for their positions. 
He does justice to what each position 
asserts but ultimately argues for taking 
international human rights as a legal prac-
tice to be viewed instrumentally for its 
usefulness rather than as a “mirror” to any 
one set of original principles. Concerns 
that rights discourse is too individualistic 
are overstated, Buchanan insists, because 
human rights always focus on the social 
setting in which conditions for leading a 
good life must transpire. We just do live 
with others, and rights discourse is one 
way we have found to manage conflicts 
that inevitably arise between persons and 
groups. Many who argue for rights for 
individuals on a priori grounds of human 
dignity worry that any other approach 
threatens to sacrifice individuals to con-
sequentialism, but Buchanan contends 
that one can recognize the importance 
of securing public goods without denying 
protection to individuals. He also reminds 
us that protecting individuals does not 
solve every problem of injustice, as rights 
regimes can coincide with systemic dis-
crimination. One must look at the small 
and large pictures simultaneously in order 
to do justice.
That is why Buchanan argues for an 
“ecological” view of the legitimacy of 
human rights legal institutions: “it is often 
not possible to determine the legitimacy 
of an institution in isolation; instead, its 
legitimacy may be a function of how it 
fits into a network of institutions.”1 If we 
think of the legitimacy of international 
human rights law in this way, the question 
is not only whether the United Nations 
Security Council, treaty-making bodies, 
or the International Criminal Court are 
legitimate, but how all these parts of the 
larger whole operate together to provide 
what constituents need and expect. And 
if that is how legitimacy is created, then 
there is also room for nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) in international 
human rights law, even though they are, 
as Buchanan puts it, “reliable external 
agents to gather and integrate the infor-
mation and make it available in under-
standable form to relevant stakeholders.”2 
So, though NGOs are external to states, 
and must be in order to be legitimate, 
that legitimacy also depends on how their 
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work serves the legitimacy of states by 
offering neutral judgments about states’ 
human rights records. 
The worry remains that a robust 
international system is not compatible 
with individual states’ constitutional 
democracies. Buchanan visits both sides 
of the problem and argues that, though 
international human rights law may 
modify constitutional democracies’ 
policies, at times without democratic 
authorization, the risk may not be more 
weighty than that posed by the kind of 
indeterminacy that always is part of law. 
He adds, however, that one should not 
blithely dismiss concerns about loss of 
self-determination when international law 
is not treated carefully by domestic juris-
dictions. Instead of posing the problem as 
a false dilemma—international rights or 
domestic constitution—Buchanan recom-
mends judgment: the common practice 
of balancing competing values. 
That leads us back to his main idea: 
human rights as they are practiced at 
present are largely a legal phenomenon 
(which means we escape the need to 
agree on a moral foundation for them), 
and the legal system created to express 
them may not be up to some of the 
larger tasks that proponents of human 
rights might expect the system to fulfill. 
Per Buchanan, “the most basic idea of 
the international legal human rights 
system is to use international law to set 
standards for how all states are to treat 
individuals under their jurisdiction, for 
the sake of those individuals themselves, 
considered as social beings, rather than 
for the sake of promoting state interests.”3 
The fact that there is such a system is no 
small achievement, if one steps back and 
looks at the history of state relations. As 
Buchanan points out, it very easily could 
have never come to pass that an inter-
national order of states would concern 
itself with individual human beings. But 
the existing international “regime” of 
human rights that does provide protec-
tions to many, if imperfectly, is still blind 
to larger, deeper conditions of inequal-
ity in which it is complicit (in part due 
to that blindness). Buchanan does a 
good job balancing between idealism 
and pragmatism in his discussion of 
the limitations of human rights norms 
at present and what remedies might be 
possible. He reminds us that the field of 
international human rights law does not 
currently have any way of regulating how 
non-state actors influence human rights 
abuses—the International Monetary Fund 
and World Trade Organization are not 
subject to human rights conventions, 
though states cooperating together could 
make such enforcement possible; the 
international order is also very shaky on 
how to respond to states that do not ful-
fill their obligations to protect their own 
citizens—whether the danger comes from 
inter- or intra-state conflict or widespread 
neglect of the well-being of those who 
reside in a territory; and the system of 
global human rights has not figured out 
how to think meaningfully (let alone act) 
about structural violence built into its 
own composition.
This last truth forces us, Buchanan 
argues, to “be more critical about the 
very meaning of the commitment to 
affirming and protecting basic equal 
status that I have said is central to the 
international human rights enterprise.”4 
At present, it seems most states adhere 
to what Buchanan calls an intra-societal 
interpretation of the commitment to 
protecting human rights: states protect 
their own citizens and expect others to 
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do the same. But if we switch to a global 
interpretation, international human rights 
law is given a more ambitious set of goals: 
protecting all human beings from abuse, 
regardless of the territory in which they 
live. Such an ambition is clearly found 
within the philosophical underpinnings 
of human rights, but has not yet been 
formed into compelling institutional rules 
and practices. Nonetheless, Buchanan 
contends, it is hard to make an argument 
(philosophical or pragmatic) in favor of 
equal status of persons within states with-
out implying that persons ought also to be 
equal regardless of where they “belong.” 
So we are left with an exigency—to 
grant meaningful human rights to all hu-
man beings—in a regime of human rights 
law that cannot live up to the task. Hu-
man rights law can diagnose the problem, 
but is unable to solve it. Buchanan does 
not think this renders human rights law 
meaningless, as it would be wrong to as-
sume any one instrument could solve all 
of the world’s problems: “the problem is 
not lack of legal coverage. The problem is 
that so far the Practice has not developed 
adequate mechanisms, whether legal 
or political, for ensuring that the most 
basic social and economic rights (and 
economic liberties) of people in the less 
economically developed countries are 
realized.”5 If the Western world has not 
found a practice that would live up to 
its human rights ambitions, that may be 
so, not because the West has formulated 
rules that benefit its privileged citizens 
rather than those less well off, Buchanan 
speculates, but because the founders of 
international legal human rights have 
“overgeneralized from the experience of 
economic prosperity in the West. They 
may not have appreciated how difficult 
it would prove to be for many countries 
to achieve the adequate standard of living 
to which the system says each individual 
has an international legal human right.”6 
And if that is true, what is owed may be 
more than formal equality can provide. 
Buchanan may be right that this failing 
is due to an oversight of the founders; 
however, it is one deeply entrenched in 
the liberal rights tradition, as one can 
see from the history of arguments over 
whether political and civil rights should 
be ranked higher than social, economic, 
and cultural rights. If “the West” has ar-
gued for that ranking, part of the reason 
for that preference will be philosophical 
or ideological, although part also will 
have been pragmatic. It is easier to pro-
vide formal equality than it is to create 
meaningful equality.
It is relatively easy to determine who 
must act when we say that states are 
responsible for protecting their own. 
Governments must act, and governments 
are responsible, when that is the standard. 
But if injustice is built into the global 
structure, then even in a world where all 
governments fulfilled their human rights 
duties, some lives would not be granted 
minimal conditions of human thriving. 
That is where it becomes difficult to de-
termine who or what is responsible for 
fixing the problem. 
It is an important point. I find it in-
teresting, then, that Buchanan does not 
really develop a theory of responsibility. 
What he argues seems to require that 
those who care about human rights 
reform their understanding of responsibil-
ity, so that it becomes something other 
than the kind of legal culpability where 
agents are responsible only for their acts 
and formal/legal equality gets equality’s 
job done. Such a reformed understand-
ing may be difficult to manage if a legal 
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order is, as his title suggests, the heart of 
human rights. But even though Buchanan 
does not take up a theory of responsibil-
ity directly, he does show that, in order 
to remedy the problem, we will need 
more than the current system. States 
need to create and take on new duties, 
and this might be better expressed in a 
vocabulary of fairness rather than rights, 
Buchanan suggests. In other words, a 
system of human rights needs more 
than rights in order to make good on 
its promises. Buchanan believes that 
this can be achieved by a new kind of 
international law. One could also argue 
that something other than law is needed 
here—without slipping back into the ar-
gument about moral grounding, which I 
do think Buchanan is right to step away 
from in this book. Buchanan’s aims are 
reformist rather than revolutionary, as he 
argues in his chapter on ethical plural-
ism. I agree with him that it may not be 
wise to “throw out” human rights when 
that discourse has clearly lent support to 
so many struggles for self-determination 
for both groups and individuals. What 
I do not see, however, is how states or 
persons end up creating and taking on the 
new duties that a global form of human 
rights would require without a theory of 
responsibility—a real revision of how the 
rights tradition describes responsibility 
and its limits. 
When we think of ourselves as con-
senting to duties, it is easy to think we 
do not owe things to people far away or 
that we are not responsible for things we 
did not directly do. That kind of reasoning 
will likely not be up to the task put before 
us by the more ambitious form of human 
rights that Buchanan describes. So, rather 
than arguing about moral grounding or 
resting satisfied with a narrative of state 
responsibility, those who care about 
human rights need to admit that its full 
realization is compatible with wide-scale 
deprivation, and, for that reason, they 
ought to begin reformulating what it 
means to be responsible for justice. Such 
a responsibility will not only be the result 
of culpable acts or sovereign duty, but 
also of acknowledgement of the human 
condition: the human world is built by 
human beings (and states) responding 
to each other, for better and for worse. 
We are affected by others whether we 
like it or not—that is both a real limit 
to consent theory and a reason why we 
want equality and rights protections in the 
first place. Buchanan argues something 
similar, but I want to hear more about 
what it is, beyond law, that will get that 
work done. It may be that in wanting 
that I have fallen farther on the side 
of idealism than legalism would allow. 
But I also think that seeking out a new 
theory of responsibility for justice is as 
pragmatic as it is idealist. When questions 
arise about why, if we care about human 
rights, individuals or states may owe more 
than what they would consent to owe, 
the grounding does not come only from 
law or moral philosophy, but also from 
practical realism: how else will the job 
of human rights get done? 
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